Ten Days to Kamikaze is a series that explores the decision-making process and implementation of Japan’s use of suicidal crash dives during World War II. It provides an in-depth review of the critical ten-day period and examines the background leading up to those decisions. In Part V, I discuss the following topics: Main landing on Leyte commences; MacArthur returns; Kamikaze corps is expanded but no missions are launched

If you are just joining the series, you can read previous posts here:

Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part I

Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part II

Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part III

Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part IV

Now on to Part V!

October 19

Halsey’s carriers were active against Clark and the Manila area. Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 launched a fighter sweep and three strike missions during the day amounting to 347 sorties. Only the fighter sweep was intercepted by Japanese aircraft with three of the estimated sixteen interceptors claimed destroyed. Ground claims were for twenty-three aircraft destroyed and twenty-seven damaged. There were numerous claims for destruction and damage to shipping.

In the south the escort carriers launched 125 sorties against the Visayan Islands in addition to strikes against Leyte. For the period 17-19 October Task Force 38 claimed 95 air victories and 99 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Task Group 77.4 claimed 36 planes destroyed and 28 damaged in raids on airfields on Cebu, Negros and Panay. In the balance of aircraft losses and reinforcements/repair, the Japanese navy’s operational numbers rose slightly to forty while the army’s declined.

During the day, eighteen Fifth Air Force P-38s strafed targets on Mindanao. Thirteen P-47s made the long trip (565 miles) from Morotai to Cebu for the first Fifth Air Force mission north of Mindanao. They engaged in ground strafing claiming aircraft destroyed but encountered no aerial opposition. Three Thunderbolts were lost one of which was known to be hit by ground fire. With the availability of Morotai as a base PB4Y’s of VPB-101 and 115 could range farther across the Philippines and into the South China Sea. A VPB-101 Liberator claimed six airplanes destroyed on the ground and three floatplanes destroyed at their moorings. These claims are verified by Japanese sources. The land planes were assault bombers of the 66th FR. The Japanese claim to have shot down the Liberator is also verified. It crashed several miles from Puerta Princesa. The crew survived and was rescued by friendly natives. Another PB4Y shot up seaplanes moored at the south end of Mindoro Island claiming two Daves (Type 95 recon seaplanes) destroyed and others damaged. On the same day a VPB-115 Liberator claimed a Pete floatplane destroyed on the water off Samar Island.

Both Japanese army and navy air commanders were concerned about conserving and supplementing their deteriorated air strength. They sought to resuscitate it through local repair efforts and through reinforcement. They wanted to avoid additional losses. On the other hand, Sho-1 was in full effect for both navy and army. Contact reports showed numerous enemy ships operating nearby which seemed to be the advanced guard of an imminent invasion of the Philippines. They could hardly be entirely ignored. Enemy carrier task forces had proved to be hard targets but lesser warships, auxiliary aircraft carriers and transports might be worthwhile but lower risk targets.

Several Type 1 fighters of the 26th and 204th FRs, each carrying a mechanic in addition to a pilot, transferred to Fabrica airfield on Negros Island the previous day. They mounted a series of attacks against Leyte shipping during the day with five Type 1 fighters carrying bombs. They were joined by fifteen Type 3 fighters of the 17th and 19th FRs which probably flew both escort and attack missions. Total Japanese offensive sorties reportedly numbered 25. Also, on the previous day the Fifth Base Air Force sent a message directing fighter, bomber and attack units to send all available aircraft to Puerta Princesa, Palawan Island, in order to attack shipping off Leyte on the nineteenth. The order was cancelled apparently before any movement took place. At Mabalacat north in the Clark airfield complex Air Group 201 prepared a more modest shipping attack, however, preparations were delayed by American air attacks. In addition to short range searches the navy sent out a Ginga and four land attack bombers one of which failed to return.

The army attacks cannot all be clearly associated with events from American reports. The first was an attack shortly after noon by an aircraft, variously identified as a carrier bomber or a Hamp, that approached over high ground on Nomonhon Island and dropped a bomb near destroyer U.S.S. Ross. Ross had been seriously damaged by striking two mines during the hours of early morning darkness and was stationary undergoing salvage operations when attacked. The bomb caused only minor additional damage but added two seriously wounded personnel to Ross’ already large casualty list. More than two hours passed before the next attack again by a single aircraft. Two bombs fell near minelayer H.M.S. Ariadne but caused no damage. An hour later a group of small mine sweeping vessels operating close ashore at Leyte reported four aircraft overhead but mentioned no damage. More than an hour after that a bizarre incident occurred. Crewmen on cruiser Louisville saw an aircraft suddenly appear out of clouds seemingly intent on a dive bombing attack. There was too little time to bring AA guns into action when…a wing flew off and the aircraft disintegrated in mid-air. Reports presumed too high a diving speed. A bomb fell free and hit near destroyer Richard P. Leary without causing damage. The aircraft was variously identified as a Val and a Zeke. The Japanese army reported three warships and three transports damaged. Three Japanese aircraft were lost. None of these attacks was picked up on radar and despite the CVE’s maintaining a target CAP of Wildcats all day none was intercepted. One Type 3 fighter (Tony) was claimed near Cebu possibly a fighter returning from one of the attacks recorded above. A TBM strike aircraft reported chasing and shooting down a Zeke in the same vicinity.

Air Group 201 at Mabalacat had received orders late the previous night to attack ships off Leyte. Air Group commander Capt. Sakae Yamamoto and his flight officer Lt. Cdr. Tadashi Nakajima were engaged in planning the attack when a message arrived from Manila. They were directed to report to V-Adm. Onishi in Manila at 1400 hours. Although Onishi had not yet taken command this was hardly an order to be ignored. Soon after receipt, however, enemy aircraft attacked Mabalacat. Raids and reports of incoming raids persisted throughout the morning hours. Only in the early afternoon did they have good intelligence about the location of American carriers off Leyte; the twin-engine aircraft sighted by American ships at 1247 may have been the source of the report. After the attack force was launched Sakae and Nakajima headed to Manila by car about 1330. This was hardly a joy ride as pro-American Filipino nationalist guerillas were active on Luzon as well as outlying islands. However, flying also risked interception by roving American attack aircraft. Moreover, their late start meant it was impossible to get to Manila by 1400. Meanwhile Onishi and members of the Fifth Base Air Force staff initiated discussions with Capt. Kosei Maeda, commander of Air Group 761 at Clark, and his operations officer. Presumably opinions tended to focus on fighters as more suitable than bombers for the mission. Depressingly, Maeda revealed he had only four operational aircraft, two each Gingas and Type 1 land attack bombers.

The strike which was launched from Mabalacat at 1320 hours included just six Zero fighters and a Suisei guide plane.[1] The Zeros each carried two underwing 60kg bombs. The Zeros were organized in two flights of three. Within minutes of takeoff two Zeros aborted presumably with technical difficulties. Weather caused detours seem to be the reason the flight took longer than would a direct flight from Clark to Leyte. Shortly before 1600 the flight was in the vicinity of Cebu. The Suisei separated from the fighters at this point. The fighters headed east. They divided into a flight of three and a single. The three plane flight crossed the northern neck of Surigao Island passing out over its eastern coast and then turned back over Dinagat, then turned east again. Having failed to sight an aircraft carrier where expected they turned north in the direction of Homonhon Island. Finding no carrier there another of the many targets available was chosen – a “battleship” in fact minesweeper (converted destroyer) U.S.S. Hovey. The three planes executed the attack in a high speed glide releasing bombs from about 1,000 feet altitude. Six bombs closely bracketed Hovey. The nearest impact was five yards ahead of the bow. Three other bombs hit within ten yards of the ship. Remarkably none caused any damage or casualties. Two hits on the bow were claimed by the flight leader with a near miss within five meters claimed by each of the other pilots. The loner passed the southern tip of Leyte and then turned up Surigao Straight also attacking a “battleship” claiming a hit on the stern and a miss within twenty meters. Cruiser-minelayer H.M.S. Ariadne reported it was attacked by a Zeke with one bomb landing on shore and another within 200 yards. All the Zeros escaped without damage and landed at Cebu. There each plane was reported to have some sort of mechanical malfunction. This plus the fact that two planes aborted the mission may suggest the Japanese were rushing repaired planes into action lacking maintenance up to normal operational standards.

Minesweeper U.S.S. Hovey near missed by Zero fighter-bombers

Capt. Yamamoto arrived at 1st Air Fleet headquarters only to discover that Admiral Onishi was not there.[2] He had left by car to go to Mabalacat to meet since Yamamoto was apparently delayed by operational exigencies. Sensing now, if not previously, that the meeting must be very important Nakajima called nearby Nichols Field to have a plane readied. He and Yamamoto would return to Mabalacat in a short flight rather than go by road. They had unknowingly passed Onishi on the road between Clark and Manila. At Nichols Nakajima did not like the sound of the Zero’s engine. He ordered the spark plugs changed. Even after this the aircraft did not sound right but considering that the flight was only twenty minutes he decided to go. Yamamoto got into the space behind the pilot’s seat and Nakajima took off. The error in this thinking was soon confirmed first by the landing gear failing to retract then by gasoline fumes followed by engine failure. The Zero crash landed in a rice paddy. Nakajima was only scratched, and he helped Yamamoto out of the Zero. Yamamoto’s ankle was broken.

Arriving at air fleet headquarters in a bedraggled condition, the two officers learned the reason for Onishi’s summons from his chief of staff. Yamamoto put in a call to the admiral at Mabalacat. Yamamoto advised Onishi of his condition, said he was in accord with the admiral’s views on the subject under consideration and that his deputy Cdr. Tamai had full authority regarding matters at Mabalacat.

Discussions at Mabalacat involved not only Onishi and Cdr. Asaichi Tamai, but Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, 1st Air Fleet operations officer who was present at Mabalacat. Two and half years earlier as a personnel officer, Inoguchi objected to suicidal tactics. Cdr. Chuichi Yoshioka of the 26th Air Flotilla, and leaders of two of Air Group 201’s sub-units Lts. Masanobu Ibusuki and Takao Yokoyama were also involved. The question was not primarily about whether crash tactics would be introduced. There was some discussion about how effective they might be. The likelihood of scoring a hit was considered higher than with conventional level bombing. A Zero with a 250kg bomb hitting a carrier’s deck would render the carrier inoperable for at least several days, i.e., the ship would be hors de combat in the pending battle. The critical question was how the suicide unit would be organized and by whom. Tamai adjourned for a private discussion with Ibusuki. Tamai returned to say he concurred entirely with the admiral’s views and that Air Group 201 would carry out the proposal. He requested, “May I ask that you leave to us the organization of our crash dive unit?”

What role Inoguchi played in the discussions is not clear. His post-war U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey interview demonstrates he was an unapologetic advocate of Kamikaze attacks.[3] Moreover, he was a purveyor of the Admiral Arima myth. Per Inoguchi: “For example, on 15 October, Admiral Arima, Commander of the 26th Air Squadron, himself dove into an aircraft carrier. Admiral Arima lit the fuse of the ardent wishes of his men in order to bring their wishes into reality.” Possibly Inoguchi would, or already had, marketed the Arima myth to promote pilot acceptance.

Onishi withdrew leaving the officers of Air Group 201 to work out details. Of twenty-three NCO pilots who were assembled to hear of the opportunity to volunteer for the crash dive project, all did. Lt. Yukio Seki accepted the offer to lead the unit. The new unit was given the inspirational name of Shimpu Tokubetsu Kogekitai (Shimpu Special Attack Unit).[4] The same Japanese symbol is pronounced Shimpu in the On pronunciation system and Kamikaze in Kun pronunciation; both mean God Wind or less literally Divine Wind. The term evokes a storm that destroyed a Mongol fleet intent on invading Japan in 1281. Four sub-units were also given honorific names: Asahi, Shikishima, Yamato, and Yamazakura. By the end of the day on October 19th a special suicidal crash-diving unit had been formed.

On this afternoon and the next day, the Japanese populace received information by press and radio of an Imperial General Staff communique that announced successes against the enemy fleet that attacked Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines for a week commencing 10 October. Results achieved included eleven aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers and a destroyer or light cruiser sunk. Those reported heavily damaged were eight aircraft carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, and a destroyer. Numerous other ships were characterized as set afire. Press reports told the Japanese people that this was a major event in the war crippling enemy capabilities. Reportedly public expectations were high that this was a turning point in the war.

October 20

The newly appointed suicide pilots awaited their first mission. It was not until afternoon that a worthwhile target, an enemy carrier group, was reported east of Luzon. It was too distant for an effective attack. It is not clear how this determination was made although it may have been based on radio intelligence rather than visual observation. The only snooper encountered by Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 during the day was a Judy (Suisei) intercepted and shot down by CAP fighters thirty miles from the carriers about 0840. In any event no suicide attack was ordered.

Off Leyte, battleships Maryland and West Virginia survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack opened fire at 0600 hours. Before long, six battleships were pounding the landing beaches and inland targets. Later cruisers and destroyers joined in then LCI’s firing mortars or rockets. At 1000 hours troops started coming ashore from landing craft. There were three landing zones Dulag, Tacloban and Palo. In the southern zone, Japanese counter fire damaged four LSTs and temporarily drove others off but overall, the landings went according to plan.

Operation Sho-1 was fully in motion. Its First Striking Force had sortied from Singapore and Lingga Roads on the 18th and was approaching northern Borneo for refueling at Brunei with seven battleships, twelve heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and twenty-three destroyers. The Second Striking Force was between Japan and Formosa with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and seven destroyers. The so called Main Force sortied from Japan with an understrength air group, a fleet carrier, three light carriers, two hybrid battleship/aircraft carriers, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. The Americans were not yet aware all these forces were at sea headed for the Philippines.

Lt. Cdr. Nakajima returned to Mabalacat from Manila on the morning of the twentieth. He learned of the discussions and decisions of the previous afternoon and evening from Cdr. Tamai. He flew one of eight Zeros, escorts and attackers, Yamato Tai, to Cebu that afternoon. Each Zero was equipped to take a 250kg bomb in lieu of a drop tank. Upon arrival Nakajima gave a pep talk to Zero pilots at Cebu and solicited volunteers for the crash dive project.

Gen. MacArthur returns to the Philippines

While the new special attack corps was thus engaged, the main American landings at Leyte initially met relatively sparse opposition. Mortars and light weapons caused some damage to landing craft and casualties among troops. A destroyer was the only warship to suffer damage from shore fire. Despite the earlier enemy fire, the C-in-C SWPA, General MacArthur, stepped ashore from a landing craft in the early afternoon. By 1400 he was broadcasting a message to the Filipino people (and subsequently the world) via special radio set up announcing his return after two and half years; his message, liberation was at hand.

The Japanese army’s 2nd Flying Division started early launching, twenty planes of which a reported fourteen made attacks, including five Type 1 fighters armed with bombs. Half a dozen aircraft from this mission, apparently heavy fighters of the 45th FR, failed to make attacks. The first attack and only army clear success of the day came at 0607 hours when the new (commissioned January 1944) 1,600-ton rescue and salvage vessel Preserver’s hull was struck by a bomb. Serious damage was caused. Preserver (ARS-8) did not sink but was out of the war. The ship was decommissioned after the war but back in service for Korea and a long career. In 1986, divers from Preserver found the wreckage of the crew compartment and crew remains from the Space Shuttle Challenger.

U.S.S. Preserver survived damage and served post-war

Several minutes later, cruiser Louisville went on alert because of two army fighters within range. Two bombs missed. One fell within 50 yards but caused no damage. Minutes after that LSTs were under attack but again no damage was reported. About an hour later an army fighter attacked LCT(R)-31 with no damage from its bomb. Five Type 100 heavy bombers of 62nd FR carried out attacks late in the day which cannot be related to any American damage although some ships took the five medium bombers (as Americans rated them) under fire. One army aircraft was lost in Leyte attacks during the day.

Land based aircraft increased the tempo of their search and attack missions from Morotai. Single squadrons of U.S. Army B-25s, P-38s and P-47s engaged in attack missions over the southern and central Philippine Islands. A Navy PB4Y-1 of VPB-115 sighted a Japanese fighter while attacking a small ship off Negros Island. The fighter believed to be an Oscar landed at an auxiliary strip at Dumaguete. It apparently failed to notice the navy Liberator and the bow gunner took it under fire as it landed. The plane ground looped with the pilot observed running for cover among palm trees bordering the strip. Additional passes burned the fighter on the strip as well as three others identified as Oscars or Nates in camouflaged revetments. Four others were hit but did not burn. Another PB4Y-1 flying a search east of the Philippines encountered a Betty and shot it down. These missions, while causing only modest material damage provided valuable information to the invaders. From the lack of opposition and sparse sightings of the enemy forces they provided confidence that the Leyte landing was unlikely to encounter a serious threat from the direction of the southern Philippines.

An hour after the last of the morning army attacks, three navy Zeros from Cebu approached Leyte intent on finding the aircraft carriers they had missed the previous day. They crossed Leyte and went farther east. Due to a cloud layer, both the Japanese fighters and their intended victims, Task Unit 77.4.1 or Taffy 1, were surprised upon their approach. At about 0830, the fighters went into a quick glide and two of them dropped bombs from about 1,500 feet. The bombs straddled escort carrier Santee, two on either side with no resulting damage. The Zeros flew out of sight to the east. Several minutes later the three fighters came back to the task unit of carriers and destroyers from the west at low level. Two fighters strafed wildly while the flight leader skipped a 250kg bomb into the hull of escort carrier Sangamon.

Escort carrier Sangamon damaged in a skip bombing attack

The bombing Zero was caught in a crossfire of carriers and destroyers, burst into flames and crashed. Another Zero was shot down by a Hellcat flown by Lt. (j.g.) Herman Weiss almost immediately after he left Sangamon’s flight deck. The third Zero fell victim to VF-35 CAP Hellcats flown by Lt. (j.g.) Kenneth Wildeson and Ens. Robert Chaney after a fifty mile chase. They had to fly at 260 knots (300 m.p.h.) at low level to gradually catch up to the Zero.

Possibly the bomb that hit Sangamon wobbled and impacted other than head on or the fuze was defective. For some reason the bomb broke apart and only partially detonated, knocking some steel plating off the hull and throwing some fragments and bomb parts on the ship. Three men were slightly wounded. Half of the bomb sank and detonated under water. The resulting shock caused electrical circuit breakers on the carrier to fail resulting in loss of both steering and propulsion. The faults were soon rectified. The ship was under way again in a quarter hour. The damage was a minor inconvenience. Had other attackers been nearby the story of an escort  carrier temporarily dead in the water might have been different. Despite all attacking planes being lost a report of two escort carriers hit got back to Cebu, by what means, possibly via a radio report from the third Zero shot down, is not clear.

Though banged up and rather severely burned, the pilot of the bombing Zero was rescued from the water by destroyer U.S.S. Trathen. He was not interrogated on the destroyer and reportedly his only words were spoken as he left the ship. He thanked the ship’s doctor for his care and apologized for his poor English. Somehow the ship’s report gave his name as PO 1/C Yashio Yamamoto, a false identification subsequently repeated in published accounts of the incident. After a couple hours on board Trathen, he was transferred to Unit flagship Sangamon. There his questioning was apparently conducted with rather less skill and rigor than would have occurred with intelligence personnel better trained in interrogation techniques. His answers were found to be vague and inconsistent. His interrogators did not accept at face value his self-identification as PO 1/C Yoshio Hamada. Based on identification on his clothing and a draft combat report found on his person which he admitted he had written the interrogation report concluded he was “Aviation Warrant Officer Hamata, Air Group 301.” Hamata is a typographical error or garble of what is found in the translated combat report. Most likely he was the Warrant Officer Hamada who shows up in the 1 October 1944 list of warrant officers and above of Air Group 201. There he is listed as attached to fighter unit S311 having arrived at the unit on 25 August. Thanks to the interrogation report we have a translation of his relatively detailed combat report of 19 October 1944. Along with the unnamed pilot whose bomb hit Franklin on 15 October, Hamada is one of only two Japanese Zero pilots to hit an American aircraft carrier with a bomb during the ten days reviewed by this study. With a single very notable exception to be described in a later episode no Japanese attack aircraft inflicted serious damage on an American carrier during this period prior to 25 October.

A Tenzan of K256 (752 Ku) torpedoed U.S.S. Honolulu

Later that evening Admiral Onishi formally assumed command from Admiral Teraoka. Shortly before midnight, less than four hours after assuming command, he sent a message to Air Group 201 with information copies to other headquarters incorporating the decisions of the previous day:

1. The Commander Air Group 201 will organize special crash attack units with all presently available strength, and, by October 22nd, will be ready to assign these units to the destruction of enemy carriers east of the Philippines.
2. These attack units will be called Shimpu Special Attack Units.
3. Commander Air Group 201 will make preparations to organize additional special attack units from future reinforcements[5]

During the day the escort carrier squadrons carried out their air support missions encountering little air opposition. Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 joined in with attacks on the Visayas and northern Mindanao. They encountered no air opposition and saw few aircraft on the ground at airfields they attacked.

The 5th Base Air Force would have only thirty-three combat planes operationally available at the start of the following day. Onishi received word that more than 300 aircraft of the Sixth Base Air Force were on their way with the first arrivals expected on the 22nd. The 4th Air Army was down to sixty operational aircraft. Its first reinforcements were from the 3rd FR. Some of its more than two dozen Type 99 light bombers had arrived. More were expected the following day with nearly a hundred aircraft from other units arriving in time to go into action by the 24th the day before X-day of Operation Sho-1.

Time was running short to cripple American carrier based air power or slow the flow of invasion personnel and equipment arriving on the Leyte beaches. Despite their small number Onishi hoped his new special attack units would get into action and make a difference. In the Naval War College analysis of the Battle of Leyte Gulf Commodore Bates states that Lt. Gen. Tominaga was undoubtedly aware of his navy counterpart’s decision to organize special units to carry out crash dive tactics. At this point there was no indication Tominaga intended to do likewise.

[1] Details of the Japanese side of this attack are known in part thanks to the translation of a draft mission report taken from the person of a captured Japanese pilot on the following day as will be more fully discussed below.

[2] The narrative of activities at Manila and Mabalacat in this section is primarily based on  Divine Wind (note 2, Part II) and Bates Analysis Vol. II (note 1, Part I).

[3] U.S.S.B.S. Interrogation Report Navy No. 12. In early 1944 Inoguchi was commander Air Group 153 (mixed fighter/reconnaissance aircraft) in the Netherlands East Indies. Immediately prior to joining the staff of the 1st Air Fleet in August 1944 he was senior staff officer, 23^rd Air Flotilla.

[4] Inoguchi claimed that he and Cdr. Asaichi Tamai came up with the name Shimpu. According to an S308 Zero suicide pilot captured after a crash landing in December 1944: ”PW insisted that the correct pronunciation of the character is SHIMPU and that he had never heard any unit referred to as KAMIKAZE.” Preliminary Interrogation Report, Kazuo Shima, (8^th Army ATIS, 10 March 1945).

[5] Bates Analysis Vol. III (note 1, Part I) pp. 241-242, edited to correct terminology.