Ten Days to Kamikaze is a series that explores the decision-making process and implementation of Japan’s use of suicidal crash dives during World War II. It provides an in-depth review of the critical ten-day period and examines the background leading up to those decisions. After the initial success of the Kamikaze attacks, Navy Air Group 201 receives reinforcement with more Kamikaze pilots. This move is followed by the deployment of additional Navy units. Both the Imperial General Headquarters and the Japanese Government praise these attacks. Subsequently, Japanese Army flying units also join the assault, marking a definitive shift towards the use of suicide tactics for the remainder of the war.
If you are just joining the series, you can read previous posts here:
Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part II
Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part III
Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part IV
Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part VI
Ten Days to Kamikaze – Part VII
Now onto the Finale!
The hour after dawn on October 25 was filled with dramatic moments in the waters off Leyte Gulf. Aircraft from the escort carriers were harassing the defeated Japanese force withdrawing from Surigao Strait. Kurita’s main force which turned back under air attack the previous day had reversed course during the night. Kurita’s ships passed through San Bernardino Strait during the hours of darkness and were headed south threatening to advance against Leyte Gulf. Only the six small carriers and the six escort vessels of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3) stood between Kurita’s armada and the vulnerable transport and auxiliary vessels. Planes from all the TG 77.4 carriers were called upon to meet this unexpected threat.
Escort carriers versus Kurita’s fleet October 25
Killer missions – success
At 0736 CVE Santee of Taffy 1 launched five torpedo armed TBMs and eight Wildcats against Kurita’s ships more than 100 miles to the north. Two flights of special attack Zeros, six crash divers and four escorts, had taken off from Davao about an hour earlier. A couple had turned back but three others were seen overhead. According to Santee’s war history:
The sudden whining cry of machine gun bullets sent men scattering for cover. Before the guns could fire the shrieking, screaming roar of a Jap plane hurtling crazily toward the deck was climaxed by a shattering explosion. Flames and gases blasted across the flight and hanger decks. Men were struck down by flying pieces of jagged metal, myriads of them from pieces of pinpoint size to pieces of decking and parts of aircraft. The fury of the explosions tore open the flight deck and tore loose steel fittings. The area near the explosion became a mass of fire, and gradually it grew into a roar which drown out the sounds of human agony.
First ship hit by a Kamikaze: U.S.S. Santee
Damage control measures were immediately put in place. Thanks to the sprinkler system and firefighting crews the fire was put out. Soon after getting the fire under control Santee was hit by what was believed to be a torpedo from a Japanese submarine. Whatever hit the ship did not penetrate the hull but exploded close by causing leaks and damage to some machinery. Santee survived both insults and remained operational. Sixteen of the crew were killed and others wounded. In addition to the strafing observers on nearby ships thought the Japanese pilot dropped his bomb just before the crash.
Another Zero was hit by AA fire and crashed close alongside Sangamon. She was slightly damaged, but one man was killed by strafing and three wounded by debris from the crashed Zero. Suwannee was hit. The crash tore a 10×20 foot hole in the flight deck and 25 foot diameter hole in the hanger deck. Seventy crewmen were killed outright or died of wounds. Another attacker came after Petrof Bay which threw up accurate AA fire and engaged in radical maneuvers. The Zero crashed close by and some of the column of water caused by the crash fell on her deck.
While carriers of Taffy 1 were undergoing attacks from the Asahi and Kikusui crash-diving units, ships of Taffy 3 were engaged in an epic battle. Kurita, due to poor visibility, did not know how small and weak his opponents were. The escort carriers came within range of the big guns of Kurita’s ships. Their screen destroyers and smaller destroyer escorts carried out skillful and heroic torpedo attacks. Escort carrier U.S.S. Gambier Bay and three ships of the screen were sunk, and others damaged. Kurita’s ships suffered damage from air and torpedo attacks including two cruisers sunk. Despite his damage Kurita still had an opportunity to disrupt American operations supporting their troops on Leyte. Inexplicably Kurita turned away and did not press on to Leyte Gulf.
From Mabalacat the Shikishima unit flew south to join the battle. The five crash divers were escorted by four Zeros led by W.O. Hiroyoshi Nishizawa considered by many to be the Japanese navy’s leading fighter ace. During the mission the escorts claimed two Hellcats credited jointly to Nishizawa and his fight companions and lost one of their number, Seaman Misao Sugawa, to anti-aircraft fire. The following day Nishizawa died when the airplane in which he was flying as a passenger was shot down.
Hiroyoshi Nishizawa leader of escort Zeros
It was late in the morning when the Shikishima unit Zeros from Mabalacat arrived over the escort carriers of Taffy 3. They apparently approached at low level over land to avoid radar detection and then made a rapid climb before carrying out their attacks. Most of which were low angle attacks. The first attacker struck the catwalk on Kitkun Bay and crashed in the sea nearby causing little damage and few casualties. Fanshaw Bay, the next victim, was not crashed but the exploding bomb caused some damage and casualties. Kalinin Bay was hit by two planes but neither penetrated her deck. Both crashed overboard. U.S.S. St. Lo (ex-Midway) did not share the luck of her mates. A Zero in a low angle dive dropped its bomb which penetrated the flight deck just before the Zero crashed on the deck. St. Lo sank with over a hundred of her crew lost. The report from Nishizawa’s escort force confirmed the success and Onishi’s confidence in the method:
U.S.S. St. Lo first ship sunk by Kamikaze attack.
Sighting an enemy force of four carriers and six other ships at 1040, distance 90 miles, bearing 85 degrees from Tacloban, Lieutenant Seki banked his plane vigorously to the right and left as a signal and then dived headlong onto one of the carriers, which he rammed successfully. A colleague followed directly behind him and crashed into the same ship, from which there rose a great column of smoke. Successful hits were scored by two more pilots, one on another flattop, the other on a light cruiser.[1]
There were other attacks during the day including a mission of six special attack planes and their escorts from Davao that failed to find a target. A mission from Cebu claimed damage to a cruiser. There was a strafing attack on destroyer escort U.S.S. Richard Rowell that resulted in slight material damage but killed three crewmen with others injured. Whether this was a conventional attack or a special attack in which the attacker failed to crash into the ship is unclear.
It was the report of the Shikishima escort pilots that arrived first at Manila confirming successful suicide attacks. The report was forwarded to Tokyo. Reports of the success of the flyers from Davao came later.
While the special attacks were taking place, conventional attacks were mounted from Luzon. The first wave of Sixth Base Air Force planes numbered 75 fighters and 29 bombers. It failed to contact the enemy and returned to Legaspi. A second try from Legaspi involved 18 fighters and 28 bombers. It failed to locate the target and ended up in combat with American fighters. A third wave was also unsuccessful.
Consequence
October 25th witnessed an important organizational change for the Japanese to take effect the following day. The 1st Combined Base Air Force was created incorporating the units of Onishi’s 1st Air Fleet and Fukudome’s 2nd Air Fleet. Fukudome became commander of the new combined organization and Onishi became his chief of staff. Onishi soon pressed Fukudome to adopt special attack tactics across the new organization. Fukudome initially demurred. For the time being crash dive tactics would be limited to units of the 1st Air Fleet and specifically to Air Group 201. Air Group 201 would soon run out of pilots unless the program was expanded. Air Group 201 was initially reinforced by about thirty experienced Zero pilots of Air Group 601 refugees from Ozawa’s aircraft carriers.
Also on the 25th Domei news service reported on results of army and navy attacks on the 24th as follows:
Three enemy transports were sunk in Leyte Gulf, while eight transports were heavily damaged or set ablaze. At the same time, our air force, striking two groups of enemy aircraft carriers comprising the main strength of the enemy task force in the waters east of the Philippines, heavily damaged two of the enemy aircraft carriers and one destroyer by scoring many direct hits.
A subsequent report later upped the damage to three aircraft carriers and two cruisers. At 4 o’clock that afternoon Dai Honyei (Imperial General Headquarters) issued a communique that incorporated both results from the 24th and the morning attacks:
Our naval fleet since yesterday morning has been launching fierce attacks with its surface and air units against an enemy task force and transport fleet in the waters east of the Philippines. The war results ascertained so far are as follows: Sunk: four aircraft carriers, including one of the Enterprise class; two cruisers; one destroyer; at least four transports. Heavily damaged: two aircraft carriers; one battleship; two cruisers. Our losses: two cruisers and one destroyer sunk.
Bomb carrying Zero takes off on a Kamikaze mission.
A communique released on the 26th set out additional losses inflicted and contained this statement on Japanese losses: “…in addition some number of planes which either deliberately crash-dived against enemy objectives or failed to return.” As has been mentioned the term jibaku had previously been used almost routinely to describe aircraft lost over an enemy objective. Nothing in the statement pointed to this as a new tactic or that a specialized unit was involved. That came two days later when Admiral Toyoda issued a proclamation extolling the gallant action of five members of a special attack unit who all bodily crashed against enemy warships on 25 October:
First Lieutenant Yukio Seki, Flight Warrant Officers Iwao Nakano, and Nobuni Tani, Chief Flight Seaman Hajime Nagamine and First Flight Seaman Shigeo Ogura as members of the “Shikishima” special attack corps spotted and launched an attack against a group of enemy warcraft with four medium-size aircraft carriers as its mainstay in the waters off Suluan Island on October 25.
By deliberately self-blasting against enemy objectives they achieved the brilliant war results of one aircraft carrier sunk, and another set afire, and one cruiser sunk.
The memory of these gallant officers and men who died a heroic death for the cause of their country will forever live in the minds of the Nippon people and in recognition of their distinguished services to the country their gallant deeds have been announced to all officers and men of the Combined Fleet.
By this time V-Adm. Fukudome’s reticence to adopt Onishi’s importunate recommendations had been overcome. In his post-war interview by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Fukudome explained the background of the change in policy:
Then on 24, 25 and 26 October, three consecutive days, the First Air Fleet under Admiral ONISHI and the Second Air Fleet carried out attacks against your Task Forces north of LUZON, operating not as one unit but separately. I followed my own tactics while Admiral ONISHI used his own. Incidentally, Admiral ONISHI’s Force was very weak at the time.
Q. What results were reported to you from the air attacks against American Forces?
A. The Second Air Force reported very limited results; namely, some damage to two carriers, types unknown. As against that, the First Air Fleet, which was much weaker in strength than the Second Air Fleet, reported several vessels sunk or damaged. This difference in results between the two fleets is to be explained by the fact that while the Second Fleet, which was relatively well balanced, followed standard tactics, the First Fleet under Admiral ONISHI attempted the so called special attack tactics which probably accounts for the difference in results.
Fukudome might have added that the 1st Air Fleet (Fifth Base Air Force) and army efforts in the previous ten days had shown similar limited results when using conventional tactics. Now there was data for comparison. While there had been talk about suicide tactics for many months, Onishi was linchpin to coalesce thought, resources and action. Onishi had been slow to conclude that Japan’s situation was desperate enough to go to the extreme of suicide tactics. Once having reached that conclusion and demonstrated some success in operations, he convinced Fukudome.
As of 27 October, the new organizational arrangement was in effect and V-Adm. Fukudome accepted special attack tactics. Pilots and aircraft were transferred to Air Group 201. Some commanding officers of other units volunteered to adopt crash-dive tactics for their units. Suisei and Type 99 carrier bombers employed crash-dive tactics for the first time. The Japanese army did not immediately follow suit but by early November Gen. Tominaga directed crash dive attacks and awarded honorific names to the units involved. Their first successful mission came on 12 November involving four attacking light bombers and eleven escorts. Two attackers carried out crash dives and a warship and a transport were claimed sunk. By the end of November suicide attacks became the predominant form of the Air Army’s anti-shipping attacks with more than one hundred crash attacks executed. Some of the specially modified Type 4 Hiryu heavy bombers brought from Japan were involved in addition to standard fighters and bombers.
Meanwhile the Dai Honyei issued a special announcement on October 31 and Kamikaze entered the English language lexicon. As published in the Japanese English language press (repeated in English language broadcasts) the announcement read:
Since October 25, our ‘Kamikaze Special Attack Corps’ has been carrying out deadly striking attacks against the enemy task force as well as groups of enemy transports in the waters east of the Philippines (including Leyte Gulf). The results scored by our special attack corps confirmed up to the present are as follows: Sunk – three aircraft carriers, one cruiser and one transport. Damaged – six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, one transport and three warships of unidentified category.
This announcement put Imperial General Headquarters on record as endorsing crash diving tactics overcoming whatever scruples might have existed at lower levels of command.[2] Not only was the term Kamikaze used in English language media instead of Shimpu, but more importantly the concept was cited with approval at the level of the high command. After a little delay the Japanese Army joined in the attacks and some Army partisans even claimed the army initiated suicide attacks.[3] While the military was committed, it was not necessarily certain that the Japanese population would understand, support or be inspired by the decision to embrace suicide attacks. The Japanese government’s cabinet information board published an apologia to explain the need for crash tactics at this time in the war and exhort increased support for the war effort (see appendix). Lurking in this memorandum was the idea that enemy gains in outlying islands shortened Japanese lines and strengthened their defensive position. Some may have viewed this and later exhortations as an appeal to the populace to support suicidal tactics within the military and even more generally even as the war situation deteriorated.
The rest as they say is history. The first successful suicide crash dive attacks came only after the Sho-1 “decisive battle”, though seemingly hanging in the balance, was essentially decided but the example of the pioneering crash diving pilots had profound effects. Kamikaze attacks persisted through the end of the war. As has been shown, during the ten days many Japanese conventional attacks had been thwarted by weather and in some cases just bad luck. In any event they had failed to cause much damage. The lack of success of conventional Japanese air attacks before October 25, 1944, the discussion of crash tactics for more than a year previously possibly crystalized by propagation of the Admiral Arima myth paved the way for the acceptance of Kamikaze attacks. Once initiated they were not limited or abandoned even after the critical phase of the battle off Leyte was over. Crash tactics seem to have been perceived by many in the military as the one means available for Japan to avoid total defeat. The more desperate the war situation became, the more deeply committed the Japanese military became to suicide tactics and associated technologies. Many Allied ships were sunk or damaged and thousands of American and Japanese lives were lost. The promise of suicide tactics to save Japan from defeat ultimately proved empty and at terrible cost.
What of the attitudes of Kamikaze pilots? Many were committed to the concept and felt it an honor to give up their lives in this way. This included not only pilots of traditional Japanese religions or agnostic but also at least one Christian. Groupthink also drove the participation. Moreover, there were pilots who declined to volunteer, and others ordered to participate that made their objections known but were sent anyway.
The post-war U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey summarized the impact of aerial suicide attacks as follows:
From October 1944 to the end of the Okinawa campaign [June 1945], the Japanese flew 2,550 Kamikaze missions, of which 475, or 18.6 percent were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses. Warships of all types were damaged, including 12 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, and 16 light and escort carriers. However, no ship larger than an escort carrier was sunk. Approximately 45 vessels were sunk, the bulk of which were destroyers…To the United States the losses sustained were serious and caused great concern. Two thousand B-29 sorties were diverted from direct attacks on Japanese cities and industries to striking Kamikaze airfields in Kyushu. Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration they might have been able to cause us to withdraw or to revise our strategic plans.
Admiral Matome Ugaki died in a Kamikaze mission after hearing that Japan would surrender.
Admiral Onishi committed ritual suicide on 16 August 1945 after the Emperor announced Japan’s surrender but before the formal surrender ceremony on 2 September 1945. His suicide note was addressed to the spirits of the tokkotai (abbreviation of tokubetsu kogekitai, special attack units): “I apologize to the spirits of my men and their bereaved families with my death.”
Appendix
Kamikaze Special Attack Force[5]
Weekly Report of 8 November 1944, issued by Japanese Cabinet Board of Information
The KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force Makes a Sortie
Imperial Headquarters Naval Information Department
Reports have come in concerning the brave men in the special submarines bearing torpedoes which meant certain death to the enemy, submarines which struck at distant PEARL HARBOR, SIDNEY HARBOR, and MADAGASCAR, and did not return. Now at a time when these remain as a keen Remembrance in the depths of the hearts of all of us, we receive information about “sure hit, sure death” heroes of the sky, the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force, spread out over the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, and it brings a lump to our throat. The KAMIKAZE Force is a special attack force of patriotic self-abandonment which takes upon itself the functions of a bomb, and whose members unite perfectly in one explosive charge the quality of a human bullet and the science of destroying enemy ships. It was originally the outgrowth of an idea of force members themselves, and its adoption was requested of their superior officers.
The name KAMIKAZE is born of a fervent prayer that the divine tempest, which saved the country in a crisis by overwhelming at one stroke the great army of Mongolia at the time of the Mongolian invasion, reappear this time in the guise of a human bullet, backed by the loyal spirit of our young flyers. Furthermore, the names of the SHIKISHIMA, YAMATO, ASAHI, YAMAZAKURA and other units which make up the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force comprise the essence of the spirit of Bushido.
“If we speak to men of the poetic spirit of Japan, We mean the scent of the mountain cherry flowers at dawning.”
The above is included in an old poem, and
“If you think it difficult not to return, Let it suffice that your name will not enter the ranks of those who have no catalpa bow;”
is written on the walls of NYOIRIN Temple and doubtless reflects the mental attitude of those who endeavor to inherit the way of life of OKUSUKBII who was struck down in a fight for a great cause.
Then, when we hear the names of units such as the CHUYU, GIRETSU, JUNCHU, SHISEI, and SEICHU which were selected for the second KAMIKAZE force, it is sufficient to make us believe in the reincarnation of the spirit of the fighting men of the Imperial Navy.
It is easy to utter the words “sure hit, sure death” and to pen the words “I will strike without returning.” But how can these brave warriors be children of humanity, born of blood relations, moreover each one a youth in his twenties who has just entered the spring of life. They probably have a great love for the land of their birth and aspire after greatness. Moreover, at their young age, how sublime is the form the young flyer who, like clear undisturbed water, moves also: winning our envy, and endeavors to live, with a smile, for The fierce eagles of the TSUCHIURA Air Unit, the cradle of the preparatory training program which produced the brave warriors of the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force, speak of their mental state upon succeeding to the rank of seniors as follows, “At the time of entering the unit death etc. were not thought of at all, and we were simply engrossed in military matters exclusively. However, when the period was half over and we approached the senior group, we heard talk of self-destruction, and we began to think of the matter of life and death. However, in no time at all, we came to understand the fact that duty is more important than the matter of life or death and the matter of whether we lived or died left out thoughts completely, and so, now, we think about how we can die most worthily. Consequently, there is no one in preparatory training who considers dying a fearful thing.”
The fierce eagles of the TSUCHIURA Air Unit, the cradle of the preparatory training program which produced the brave warriors of the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force, speak of their mental state upon succeeding to the rank of seniors as follows, “At the time of entering the unit death etc. were not thought of at all, and we were simply engrossed in military matters exclusively. However, when the period was half over and we approached the senior group2 we heard talk of self-destruction, and we began to think of the matter of life and death. However, in no time at all, we cane to understand the N fact that duty is more important than the matter o? life or death and the matter of whether we lived or died left our thoughts completely. End so, now, we think about how we can die most worthily. Consequently, there is no one in preparatory training who considers dying a fearful thing.”
While we think of them as they were only yesterday gathered jubilantly at the head of the station, wearing national banners attached to their school caps, our young ‘flyers have already become fino Imperial soldiers who have risen above life and death. Moreover, once they have left for the front lines, they all pray that they may become brave warriors of the KAMIKAZE Force. Indeed they afford the greatest reassurance, and with those brave young warriors, Japan will certainly be victorious.
The deceased Fleet Admiral YAMAMOTO, deeply impressed by the mental attitude of the brave warriors in the special submarines which earlier were ranging about near Pearl Harbor, said “In speaking of the youth of today we ought not to call them braggarts”, and called further for grave reflection by the people, These young eagles, who sally forth enthusiastically into the sky never to return again, with a smile playing upon their ruddy countenances, tanned in the southern countries, cherishing the fighting spirit which is set aflame by the destruction of enemy ships, are indeed living gods of liar. The very heart of the Commandant who slaps his respectful and devoted subordinate on the shoulder with a “Let ‘em have it” and holding back bitter tears, sees him off on the glorious road saying “Hit ’em hard; do great deeds; we are grateful to you”, that heart is cut deeply, and he feels grievously wounded.
However at the present stage of this Japanese American war we must repress our tears and boldly resolve upon unwished for sacrifices, so that the minds of our one hundred million people will be clearly impressed with the fact that we are pressing the attack. Indeed, the trend of the war is serious, In spite of the overwhelmingly great battle gains of the Imperial forces in the air battle off Formosa, the enemy reversed his course, and assembling the full power of his Pacific Fleet in the Philippine area, made a strike and has already put four divisions of soldiers ashore on LEYTE Island: In view of the large scale of their material and the vigor and pertinacity of their battle spirit, the tide of battle does not allow of optimism. Moveover, if by any chance circumstances should arise so that the Philippines fall again into the enemy’s hands; it goes without saying that a corner of the necessary line of defense of the homeland will be shattered and at the same time it will have the effect of obstructing the link of transport between Japan and the zone of military occupation and will cause a serious check to our power to prosecute the war.
Nevertheless, the situation in the Philippines is entirely different from what it was in the isolated, distant, small islands like those in the GILBERTS, MARIANAS, and MARSHALLS. These are large islands which have had more of the moral character of the continent. Accordingly, against attacks by the vulnerable enemy carriers, we possess countless unsinkable land bases throughout all the islands, and furthermore, whereas the enemy must pay the price of great waste as he lengthens and enlarges his multiple supply lines, we prefer to keep ours very short. Thus we are able to gather our military forces at points we choose thereby securing advantageous points for so-called operations on interior lines. Accordingly, we have hereupon discovered an opportunity for victory by waiting. Now if we assume that the only key to the problem of seizing this opportunity for victory is aircraft, one hundred million people must bend every effort and strive earnestly to increase the production of aircraft.
However, modern warfare, to use a hackneyed phrase, is in truth all out warfare and the Japanese American war is, in the final analysis, a decisive war in which the 130,000 people of America and the 100,000 people of Japan have been mobilized to determine who shall devote and who shall be devoured. Consequently, if the one hundred million people of Japan, each at his respective post submits to the enemy American people, the brave warriors. in the front lines cannot win this war not matter how hard they struggle to do so. That is to say, when our one hundred million people, each at his own post, have been able to overwhelm the enemy Americans at the same posts, we can anticipate for the first time the victory of Japan. Oh, stand firm: If you do not stand firm, how can you justify yourselves before the departed spirits of the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force?
And so, you who strive day and night on the ramparts of production behind the gums must remember that even one plane more is a sacred plane which rushes to destroy the enemy, when that one plane has aboard the sacred spirit of a member of the KAMIKAZE Force. The young eagles of the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force who dare to dash headlong and happily to the destruction of the enemy are waiting anxiously for that plane to fly to the front lines, saying to themselves, “I too shall go.” So it is, the brave, ruddy-faced warriors with handkerchiefs tied about their heads at peace in their favorite planes, smiling happily as if gathered to the fond bosoms of their mothers and the forms which dash out spiritedly to the attack along a path of assault from which there is no return, do they not appear vividly before us? Increase production! Stand Firm! Drive on!
[1] Evans (note 1, Part IV), p. 432.
[2] The Emperor was also informed. His comment as transmitted was “Was it necessary to go to this extreme? They certainly did a magnificent job.” According to Inoguchi, Onishi took this as criticism of his command decision. Inoguchi (note 2, Part II) p.58. The Emperor’s comment hints he gave substantial credence to claims of success in conventional attacks in the first half of October.
[3] After the fact some in the Army claimed Maj. Takada’s Biak mission in May was the first Kamikaze attack.
[4] Pacific War, U.S.S.B.S. Summary Report (1946) p. 10. As of 15 July 1945 the Japanese Navy had allotted 5,226 conventional aircraft for special attack of which 3,675 were operational. Not included but prospectively available were jet propelled and other new types in production. Outline of Naval Armament Preparation for War, Pt. VI, Monograph No. 174, p. 12. The Japanese army had additional aircraft available.
[5] OP-16-E Translation No. 264, WDC 38549, 5 July 1945