Continuing the story of the Spitfire in the Asia-Pacific, this article reviews the Spitfire in combat with Japanese army Type 1 fighters over India and Burma in late 1943 and early 1944. During most of 1943 the Royal Air Force contested air superiority along the India Burma border area against Japanese fighters with squadrons equipped with the Hawker Hurricane. The arrival of three squadrons equipped with the Spitfire Vc in early November 1943 (Nos. 136, 607 and 615 Squadrons) had an immediate impact. During November successes were achieved against high flying Type 100 Headquarters Reconnaissance planes (Dinah) a type which Hurricanes had been unable to effectively engage. The future looked bright for the Spitfire and in retrospect that was the official assessment – sort of.

We start by recording that the verdict of “received” history is that the Spitfire did just fine. In action over Australia W/C Clive Caldwell asserted that the No. 1 Fighter Wing equipped with Spitfires acquitted itself superior to R.A.F. fighters in the Battle of Britain in terms of victory to loss ratio. There is also an encomium for the Spitfire’s Burma performance from a senior officer.

AAF-IV-22

Air Chief Marshall Richard Pierse in his official dispatch on air operations in South-East Asia (November 1943 to May 1944) reported:

The advent of the Spitfire in November had already begun an era of successful interceptions in which the enemy discovered for the first time in this theater the efficacy of modern fighter aircraft backed by a well-developed system of warning and control.

However, ACM Pierse admitted “the enemy could claim a success” in the “bold strike” at Calcutta. For details see Japanese Air Raid on Calcutta. On December 5, 1943, dozens of Spitfires scrambled but only one managed to intercept and claim a bomber. The validity of the claim is questionable since a Hurricane also claimed a Sally bomber in the approach phase during which the Japanese lost only one bomber. The Spitfire was lost when it crash landed on a beach out of fuel. The bombers successfully bombed targets in Calcutta while their escorts shot down several intercepting Hurricanes and damaged others.

Spitfire VC

The first clash with Japanese fighters occurred about two weeks earlier. On November 23^rd Spitfires of 615 Squadron scrambled when Japanese Type 1 model II fighters (Oscars) engaged in a sweep of the Chittagong area. In what was apparently a brief clash one Spitfire was shot down with the pilot safe. The Japanese claimed a Hurricane rather than a Spitfire and all their fighters returned to base.

In the quotation above ACM Pierse says nothing about the Spitfire’s contribution to offensive operations. Late in November 1943 the Allied air command in India planned a campaign to neutralize the Japanese logistics hub at Rangoon prior to active ground operations that were in the offing. This would involve both day and night attacks by heavy and medium bombers. The day attacks would be escorted by fighters. The U.S. contribution was provided by P-38H and P-51A fighters. Spitfires did not have the range to escort bombers to Rangoon from any base available in India. As will be discussed below Spitfires engaging in offensive fighter sweeps over Japanese airfields in central Burma later proved far less effective than P-38s or P-51s.

The Spitfire’s second clash with Japanese fighters occurred on 28 November. Japanese bombers flying at high altitude bombed installations at Feni airfield. A dozen Spitfires from 615 Squadron joined Hurricanes from three squadrons chasing the bombers and their escort as they withdrew. 615 squadron leader R.H. Holland claimed an Oscar damaged. Hurricanes claimed an Oscar destroyed and a couple damaged for the loss of one of their number. The next day a dozen Type 99 twin engine light bombers escorted by nine Type 1 fighters damaged airfield facilities at Agartala. A dozen Spitfires joined Hurricanes from five squadrons to intercept. Spitfires claimed a Lily probable and five Oscars damaged (0-1-5). The Japanese fighters claimed four British fighters. The only loss on either side was one light bomber.

Army Type 1 fighter

The Spitfire VIII scored its first victory in Asia on 26 December. Two pilots of 152 Squadron shared a victory over a Dinah reconnaissance plane. In addition to 152 Squadron Nos. 81 and 155 Squadrons were soon operating the 400+ m.p.h. mark VIII. Later in the day the first big combat between Spitfires and Japanese attackers took place. Twenty-one Type 97 heavy bombers (Sally) were escorted by seventy-eight Type 1 fighters from 33^rd, 64^th, and 204^th Flying Regiments (FR). Thirty-seven Spitfires (136, 607 and 615 squadrons) and forty-five Hurricanes intercepted with the Spitfires seeing virtually all action. Spitfires of 615 Squadron initiated the attacks diving on the escort followed by attacks on the bombers claiming three Sallys and an Oscar plus a Sally damaged. Two Oscars and a Sally were claimed by 136 Squadron. Three bombers one of which fell to AA fire were lost as were two Oscars one reportedly due to engine failure. Japanese fighters claimed eight. One Spitfire was lost and two damaged.

The last day of 1943 saw “the greatest success” scored by the Spitfires in these early raids. Three Royal Navy motor launches (85-ton vessels armed with a 3-pounder cannon and heavy automatic weapons) bombarded Japanese positions on Ramree Island southeast of Akyab and headed back toward friendly territory. The Japanese responded with six Type 97 heavy bombers and nine Type 1 fighters. Some of the fighters carried bombs. Offshore from Akyab the attackers claimed one hit and a near miss. To cover the returning vessels, 136 and 615 Squadrons scrambled. They caught the Japanese attackers and 136 was in the thick of the action claiming eight bombers and three fighters destroyed. In addition two Sallys and two Oscars were claimed probably destroyed with three Sallys and four Oscars damaged, 11-4-7. It was also reported that two Oscars were involved in a collision. Japanese losses were three bombers shot down and three seriously damaged. One damaged Oscar force landed short of base. One Spitfire was lost and three were damaged with all pilots safe. This action was the occasion of much praise and commendation from high level to include Prime Minister Churchill. The claim of seventeen victories by 136 squadron during December was three times the combined total of the other Spitfire squadrons.

Army Type 97 heavy bomber

January 1944 saw the beginning of Allied offensive operations that eventually involved four thrusts along the western and northern perimeter of Burma from the Arakan to the Hukawng Valley. The Japanese were planning their own offensive toward Imphal in India. During the month Spitfires claimed outstanding results in a few notable combats. Actual results, not known at the time, were rather less impressive but still positive. On 15 January 136 and 607 squadrons were in action against three fighter sweeps by Oscars of the 64^th FR. Their claims of 16-6-17 were considerably more than the total number of Japanese fighters involved. Five Type 1 fighters were lost. The Japanese claimed eight Spitfires but only shot down two with a third victim being a misidentified Hurricane on a tactical reconnaissance mission. Each side’s claims exceeded actual losses inflicted by about three times.   

Hawker Hurricane IIC

The Japanese fighter force was busy beyond its clashes with Spitfires. It flew defensive missions, provided ground support, attacked Allied transport aircraft, often clashing with American fighters in the process. The month’s last major engagement between Spitfires and Type 1 fighters occurred on 20 January. Twenty-four Spitfires of 165 Wing (136 and 607 Squadrons) scrambled and were at 30,000 feet when they sighted formations of Japanese fighters at about 24,000 feet and lower at 10,000 feet estimated to number about one hundred in all. The Japanese account has forty-six Type 1 fighters of the 50^th and 204^th FRs at 6,000 and 4,500 meters (19,680 and 14,760 feet) encountering about thirty Spitfires and P-40s above them at 8,000 meters (26,240 feet). Spitfire claims mainly for “Hamps” were 7-8-8. Two Spitfires were lost, their pilots killed, and three damaged. The Japanese claimed nine certain and six uncertain victories while suffering the loss of three fighters and their pilots. A pilot of 136 Squadron attributed the loss of one fighter to AA fire. Once again there was over-claiming on both sides. Losses were essentially equal.

Lessons were learned on both sides in early operations. The publication “Spitfires in the Arakan” (Air Command, South East Asia Tactical Memorandum No. 9) contained this warning:

Perhaps the most notable feature of the Fighter v Fighter operation is the reversal of Tactics in this theater as opposed to the Western War, where our fighter squadrons used their superior maneuverability to Tactical advantage.

The lesson is obvious. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DOG FIGHT THE JAP. Keep your speed and use the superior dive and climb of the Spitfire then the Jap fighters cannot use their maneuverability.

The Japanese Current Combat Reports, No. 20 (Army Department Imperial General Headquarters) contained lessons from recent combats including the 20 January engagement:

Spitfires perform well at high altitude (7,000 meters and above). Thus when there is a combined bomber-fighter attack it is best to engage them in the medium altitude zone unless powerful enemy anti-aircraft artillery is present.

In aerial combat, it is preferable to lead the enemy to low level…In the last engagement, we gained a victory by adopting a 2,000-4,500-6,000 meter battle disposition.

It is necessary to be prepared…for sudden attacks from higher altitude.

Our low-level formations were not impressed by the tactics and performance of the enemy during the last aerial combat. However, our high altitude formations did not completely agree with this.

The bulletproof and fireproof installations of the Type 1 fighter are very effective. A certain Type 1 fighter came back to base safely after having been hit 39 times.

The Spitfires by early February had three months to find their footing along the Burma frontier in contests with Type 1 fighters. Two Spitfire VIII squadrons were active, and the Spitfire V squadrons, including victory claims leader No. 136 Squadron, were reequipping with the new fighter. Air Chief Marshall Pierse described the situation in February in his official dispatch:

The tactics which were employed to gain…air superiority over the Arakan battle front centered on three forward squadrons equipped with Spitfire Vs and a few Spitfire VIIIs…The enemy countered by… adopting the defensive circle and splitting into small groups when the circle was broken. This brought them a relative measure of success as their losses decreased whilst those of the Spitfires gradually increased.

The advantages of the Spitfire VIII in this battle were not immediately apparent, for the enemy continued to operate at his best performance height, that is 10,000 feet. No. 136 Squadron, who reequipped with these aircraft in February, could not effectively employ their high overtake speed against an enemy who exploited the maneuverability of his aircraft to the full.

In March 1944 an operation that deserves a detailed study beyond the summary presented here took place. A series of fighter sweeps based on real time radio intelligence took place. These were “snap” sweeps launched based on intercepted radio communications which indicated when Japanese aircraft were active from or assembled at specific airfields. They played a critical role in interfering with Japanese air operations as Allied ground offensives, often relying on aerial resupply, were taking place across hundreds of miles of front line and the Japanese were pushing across the Indian frontier to isolate the Allied offensive operations in north central Burma.

P-38 Lightnings of the 459^th Fighter Squadron relocated to Chittagong operating under R.A.F. 224 Group to spearhead the operation. Spitfire VIIIs of 136 and 152 Squadrons equipped with 90 gallon drop tanks participated and P-51As of the 530^th Fighter Squadron took part late in the campaign. Between 8 March and 15 May 1944 thirty-nine distinct missions were mounted. Nine were aborted due to weather and seven others were ineffective due to the absence of enemy aircraft or the enemy’s inability or unwillingness to accept combat. Air and ground claims amounted to 135-25-54. The bulk of the air and ground damage was inflicted by the P-38s with three failing to return. The Mustangs claimed several air victories as well as other damage in the air and on the ground with all aircraft returning to base. The Spitfires claimed only one aircraft destroyed on the ground. Two Spitfires failed to return.

A detailed report prepared by a U.S. Navy observer on the South East Air Command staff, The Spit VIII in India – Burma, 26 June 1944, noted that the “Jap – Spit ratio is a little better than 1+ to 1 here. Up to the present, the Spits have been doing just a little better than an even trade (Aircraft for aircraft) in the Burma theater.”  The Spitfire claims included reconnaissance and bomber aircraft in addition to fighters. Consider also the implication of the documented overclaiming often double or triple verified results. It is virtually certain in combat with Type 1 fighters the Spitfires had a negative victory to loss ratio.

The Japanese Current Combat Reports No. 20 quoted above included a statement that the Spitfire was “extremely difficult to destroy…at high altitude.” However,  “Type 1 fighters are superior to Spitfires in low-level performance, and it is possible to pursue and destroy these planes.” Apparently Japanese fighter pilots took this to heart; tried to avoid being caught by surprise diving attacks from above and then used the strong points of their aircraft to best advantage. During the period under review in this article they seem to have succeeded. Despite its beauty and certain sterling qualities Spitfires did not seem to perform great over Burma. Do you agree?  Share your thoughts in the comments below.