Ten Days to Kamikaze is a series that explores the decision-making process and implementation of Japan’s use of suicidal crash dives during World War II. It provides an in-depth review of the critical ten-day period and examines the background leading up to those decisions. The series will be presented in several parts, starting with Part 1, and subsequent parts will be released on a weekly basis. It concludes with a summary of the justifications for these extreme actions and considers the potential outcomes if the war had not ended when it did.
PART 1: THE WAR SITUATION BECOMES CRITICAL FOR THE JAPANESE
INTRODUCTION
On October 25, 1944, the American escort aircraft carrier U.S.S. Santee (CVE-29) was operating east of Leyte Island in the Philippines. At 0740 that morning a Japanese Type Zero carrier fighter attacked Santee. Diving at an angle of about 45 degrees the fighter released a bomb and immediately thereafter crashed into the carrier’s flight deck. The crash was deliberate. It was part of a premeditated tactic of using suicidal crash dives to sink or disable enemy ships.
The actions constituting the Battle of Leyte Gulf were the largest combined naval and air engagement of the Second World War. One key feature of these battles was the successful use by the Japanese of suicide tactics, piloted aircraft officially ordered and purposely crashing into ships, tactics which became known as Kamikaze attacks. The surface ship engagements and related aircraft carrier actions of the Battle of Leyte Gulf have been well studied and documented. They provide the context and background of events chronicled here: the decisions and actions of the ten days preceding the first successful crash attacks. This includes key command decisions and command changes, conventional attack tactics, unsuccessful suicide attacks, as well as attacks later described and believed to be suicide attacks that in fact were not. New insights are provided on events that have heretofore been treated in summary fashion or portrayed inaccurately. The aftermath of the first attacks and origins of the term Kamikaze are described.
U.S.S. Santee 25 October 1944
I. INVASION TARGET: THE PHILIPPINES
Japan’s strategic position deteriorated rapidly in the first half of 1944. In the Southwest Pacific forces under General Douglas MacArthur drove nearly a thousand miles along the northern coast of New Guinea to its western tip. Japan’s once powerful Southeast Area was left a collection of dispersed garrisons on the verge of starvation and awaiting destruction. Japanese air power in the region was all but destroyed. In the central Pacific forces under Admiral Chester Nimitz followed up the conquest of the Gilbert Islands by the invasion of the Marshall Islands. Key strong points at Rabaul, Truk and elsewhere were left isolated and neutralized. In June came the invasion of the Marianas and Battle of the Philippine Sea. Japan’s aircraft carrier force was profoundly weakened by losses in trained aircrew as well as losses in carriers and aircraft. Its already damaged naval land based air power in the Pacific was left in tatters. With the American occupation of the Marianas and Biak Island they were just 1,500 miles from Tokyo and Manila, respectively. So stark was the situation that mid-July brought a major Japanese Cabinet shakeup. Premier Hideki Tojo resigned as Prime Minister and Chief of the Army General Staff. Adm. Shigetaro Shimada resigned as Navy Minister and Chief of the Navy General Staff. Other senior officials also resigned.
The Philippines which had long been a backwater and logistics hub became a target of invasion on an accelerated schedule. Air power would play a key role in the success or defeat of a seaborne landing. The Japanese army’s 4th Air Army (Koku Gun) which had lost its combat power in New Guinea was established in the Philippines. To replace its destroyed units the 2nd Flying Division (Hikoshidan) was brought down from Manchuria. Also, in the Philippines was the 4th Flying Division which was primarily a support and training organization. The 7th Flying Division in the eastern Netherlands East Indies was also subordinate to the 4th Air Army, but it needed to be rebuilt. The Japanese navy’s land based 1st Air Fleet (Kokukantai) had to undergo complete reorganization during July and August when it relocated to the Philippines.[1]
Luzon Strait between northern Luzon and Formosa (Taiwan) and Formosa Strait between Formosa and mainland China were the key waterways between Japan and its “southern resource area” made up of the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and other islands including parts of the Philippines. Cutting off transit through this passage would not only cripple Japan’s war effort but threaten its economic life. Allied submarines had already had an impact and the placement of American airplanes at bases in the Philippines especially on Luzon could close the straits completely. The narrower Formosa Strait and south China coastal regions were also vulnerable to Allied aircraft operating from south-central China.
The Allies had carried out a series of successful seaborne invasions in late 1943 and 1944. If they were to be stopped in the Philippines new tactics would be needed. The Japanese navy’s prime anti-ship airplane, the venerable torpedo-capable Type 1 land attack bomber (American codename Betty), had proved so vulnerable it could hardly be used in bombing or torpedo attacks during daylight. It even had to be used selectively for day search missions. To supplement the capabilities of its other attack aircraft the Japanese navy command stressed employment of Type Zero carrier fighters (codename Zeke) as fighter-bombers. In August training was begun that included not only dive bombing but attacks at masthead height which skipped bombs into the target. The Japanese army also trained its fighter pilots in bombing attacks. Army fighters and light bombers practiced skip bombing. Also known as masthead attacks, their purpose was not merely to skip bombs but to secure hits at or near the waterline of a vessel by low level approach. This was belated recognition of an effective attack technique employed with great success by the U.S. Fifth Air Force in the Southwest Pacific since early 1943 and widely adopted. Japanese training in masthead attacks was incomplete at the time of the Philippine invasion. Bombs appropriate to the tactic were not always available and reliable bomb fuzes could be in short supply.
September highlighted the reality of a forthcoming invasion of the Philippines in stark fashion. After a night raid in August, on the first of the month U.S. Fifth Air Force B-24s bombed and destroyed aircraft on three airfields near Davao in southern Mindanao for the first American day air strike on the Philippines since 1942. Additional B-24 raids added damage in the following week. Successive American carrier raids against Mindanao, the Visayas and Luzon in the middle weeks of September inflicted serious damage to Japanese air power (hundreds of aircraft claimed destroyed in the air or on the ground). The relatively weak Japanese defensive response caused the Americans to advance the date of their planned invasion. In mid-September, the Americans invaded Palau and Morotai islands. Japanese navy air units responded to the Palau invasion while the army attacked in the vicinity of Morotai. Their attacks failed to have a serious impact. American forces encountered stout ground resistance at Peleliu in the Palau Islands but at Morotai the defenders were quickly routed from key areas. Airfield operations there began in early October. The Japanese had considered a Philippine invasion attempt as early as mid-November as the basis for their planning. This happened to be consistent with Allied planning. Changed circumstances including the virtually unchecked rampage by American aircraft carrier strikes at various targets including the Philippines in September made it look like the attempt might come earlier. Allied plans did indeed change, and the planned invasion was moved up a month to mid-October. Those familiar with military staff work can imagine the flurry of activity resulting from such a change.
The Japanese high command realized that aggressive Allied operations might call for decisive battle. They had prepared preliminary plans against a major Allied advance in any of four areas. The plan Operation Victory (Sho Go) thus had four variations Nos. 1 to 4 from south to north. No. 1 (Sho-ichi Go) called for a decisive engagement in the Philippines.
This study is a detailed examination of ten days critical to the Japanese decision to officially adopt and implement suicidal crash dive tactics – October 15 to 24, 1944. The first date marks the initial attack on Luzon airbases by one of the carrier task groups (TG 38.4) of the Pacific Fleet aimed at thinning out Japanese air power before the Leyte landings. On the same day the Japanese army flew defensive missions; and army and navy planes mounted counter attacks against the American carriers. The big carriers mounted additional raids against Luzon and the Visayas over the next few days. Preliminary landings on islands near Leyte occurred on October 17th on which date minesweeping and other preliminary naval operations also commenced. The following day escort carriers of the Seventh Fleet arrived off Leyte and began their air support operations. The Japanese initiated a planned counter operation which was supposed to bring major air and surface forces into action against ships of the invasion fleet on the 22nd. Due to delays in deploying both air and sea forces that date was pushed back to the 24th and eventually the 25th. Meanwhile on the 20th the main American landings began. Japanese army and navy air units suffered significant attrition before reinforcements arrived. On the 24th Japanese army air units mounted heavy attacks against the invasion transports and their supporting warships. Reinforced Japanese naval air units struck carrier units of Task Force 38 east of Luzon on the same day. This work sheds light on the efficacy of conventional Japanese attack tactics. It provides perspective on whether resort to the desperate extreme of Kamikaze attacks was in some sense justified or, rather, why the decision was made to resort to such tactics and led the way to a general policy of suicide attacks. Finally, it addresses misinformation related to this period some of which has not only persisted for decades but been aggrandized, indeed sensationalized.
Forces gather. As October began the Philippine invasion forces were gathering. Ground forces consisted primarily of the U.S. Sixth Army which would carry out initial landings with two corps of four divisions. The U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) had grown enormously, to over 700 ships, with an influx of vessels from Admiral Nimitz Pacific Fleet many previously operating in the Central Pacific Command area. One hundred fifty-seven of these vessels were combatants.
The land based Fifth Air Force in the SWPA was very strong (over 1,000 operational combat aircraft) and they provided indirect support by attacking targets and pinning down Japanese fighters that might have been used to defend the Philippines. Prime examples were daylight raids on the Balikpapan, Borneo oil refineries and storage facilities, targets of strategic importance to the Japanese, on 10 and 14 October. The raids involved over two hundred B-24s escorted by P-38s and P-47s flying from Morotai Island in the Moluccas Islands north of western tip of New Guinea. More than fifty intercepting Japanese fighters were claimed destroyed in the raids. Three B-24s and five fighters were lost. An unescorted raid a week earlier had cost seven B-24s. Also on 14 October more than a hundred B-29s of the Twentieth Air Force flying from bases in China bombed airfields on Formosa. B-29s flew additional Formosa missions over the next few days. There were other Allied air assets (including units of the Thirteenth Air Force plus the Fourteenth flying from China) that would fly patrol and search missions in support of the invasion. The role of SWPA fighters over the Philippines in the lead up to invasion and first days after the landings was limited by the long range at which they operated (540 miles from Morotai to Leyte). Initially there were forty P-38s and thirty-five P-47s operational on Morotai. Despite the long range, they escorted B-24s and flew fighter sweeps over the southern and central Philippines during October. For example on 7 October 18 B-24s escorted by 39 P-38s started fires in warehouses, buildings, and oil storage at Zamboanga. American army air force P-38 fighters claimed their first victories operating from Leyte (Tacloban airfield) on 27 October. The primary source of Allied air power in the build up to invasion and before captured airfields could be made operational was carrier based aviation.[2]
Although the Philippines were in the SWPA, Nimitz command (he was both commander of the Pacific Fleet and of the territorial unified command Pacific Ocean Areas) provided key air power within its own area as well as into waters immediately adjacent to the Philippines within the SWPA. Task Force 38 consisted of four task groups each with at least four aircraft carriers. Generally these were two fleet carriers and two light carriers based on cruiser hulls per task group. They would strike Japanese air forces in Okinawa and Formosa as well as disrupting lines of communication before directing attacks against Luzon and the invasion area. Fleet carriers fielded air groups of 90 to 100 planes. Most fighters were F6F-5 Hellcats, the latest version of the type. Dive bombers were SB2C-2 Helldivers and torpedo/glide bombers were the TBM-1C latest model of the Grumman Avenger. Light carrier air groups averaged about forty planes. Task Force 38 carried more than a thousand operational aircraft. It also had a system for aircraft and pilot replacements based on escort carriers.
The Seventh Fleet included an escort carrier group (Task Group 77.4) consisting of three task units and eighteen escort carriers. The small carriers of TG 77.4 carried about five hundred aircraft. Fighters included the FM-2 a modernized version of the Grumman Wildcat, and F6F-3 Hellcats. Bombers were mainly TBM-1C Avengers like those on the big carriers. Another eleven escort carriers maintained the pipeline of replacement aircraft and crews for both the big carriers and the combat escort carriers. TG 77.4 provided support for invasion operations and cover for shipping in the immediate vicinity of the landings at Leyte. They would be joined by Task Force 38 in attacks on Japanese airfields and shipping farther afield.
FM-2 Wildcat flying over U.S.S. Santee – October 1944
On a theoretical basis the Japanese had substantial air power to counter the approaching threat. The 2nd Flying Division order of battle included 775 aircraft. In the last week of September, it had hardly half that number on hand and of those only 175 were operationally available. The entire 4th Air Army including the 7th Flying Division (not in the Philippines) and combat elements of the 4th Flying Division numbered only 237 operational aircraft. These included 83 fighters, 39 heavy bombers, 15 light bombers, 50 attack planes, 16 headquarters (long range) reconnaissance planes and 34 army (tactical) reconnaissance planes. One of its units was in the process of changing aircraft types from Type 99 attack planes (Ki 51, codename Sonia) to Type 2 Two-seat fighter bombers, Ki 45kai version. The 4th Flying Division was in the process of evacuating its training units to Malaya and Borneo. The Type 99 recon/attack planes of the 4th Flying Division were engaged in local ground support (anti-guerilla) operations or flying short range overwater patrols due to the navy’s shortage of search aircraft.
Among the 2nd Flying Division’s fighters only the 52nd Flying Regiment (Hikosentai or FR) was equipped with the latest Type 4 fighter (Ki 84) with 26 on hand and operational. Additional Type 4 fighters were coming but were not slated to arrive before the middle of October. Arriving earlier were the 26th and 204th FRs with two dozen Type 1 model II fighters (Ki 43-II). The 31st FR which had suffered losses in American carrier attacks in September possessed over fifty Type 1 fighters but only eight were operational. There were prospects for receiving the improved Type 1 model III. The 22nd Flying Brigade (Hikodan) had two Hikosentais equipped with the Type 3 (Ki 61) fighter. In the American codename system: the Type 1 fighter was Oscar; Type 3 fighter was Tony; the Type 2 Two-seat fighter was Nick; and Type 4 fighters would be awarded the codename Frank.
Situation in the Pacific mid-October 1944
Like the 4th Air Army, the Navy’s 1st Air Fleet looked strong on an organization chart but was much weaker in fact. On 1 October it numbered 213 aircraft with less than 170 operational. Instead of 210 Zero fighters Air Group 201 (Kokutai)[3] had 105 on hand of which 71 were operational. Instead of 48 land attack bombers there were only ten in the Philippines (6 operational) and fifteen (all operational) at the fallback base of Labuan, Borneo. All thirty Tenzan (Jill) carrier attack bombers were operational. Eight of thirteen Suisei (Judy) carrier dive bombers were operational. The dive bomber unit still had on hand three of the older Type 99 carrier bombers (Val), but none was operational. Interestingly Allied reports during October are filled with sightings of “Val” dive bombers. These were mostly misidentifications; any aircraft dive bombing might end up reported as a Val, but the most likely misidentification candidate was the army’s Sonia assault bomber which like the Val had fixed landing gear. No additional Vals were operational in the Philippines until after October 23. There were a few night fighters and reconnaissance planes plus a group of transport planes. Slightly more than a hundred aircraft were scheduled to arrive in October to help restore strength. There were also float planes under separate command. In the first week of October the 1st Air Fleet’s operational numbers were increased by the arrival of twenty-five Ginga (P4Y1), codename Francis, fast land attack bombers of K401. The other half of the unit was engaged in operational training in Japan. Also training in Japan was the 2nd Air Fleet, a force of over 400 aircraft, which would transfer once the American invasion target was confirmed as the Philippines. However, for a week or so after the initial landings the 1st Air Fleet would have to rely on its own resources.
On 10 October Japanese reconnaissance planes from the 7th Flying Division reported huge concentrations of shipping at Hollandia on Dutch New Guinea’s north coast and at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. Additional invasion shipping had gathered undetected at Finschhaven farther east and other islands. On that morning the first element of the Leyte invasion, the minesweeping group, departed Manus. Task Force 38 struck Japanese airfields, shipping, and installations on Okinawa on the same day. This was followed by strikes against Formosa and Aparri in the north of Luzon over the next few days. Between 10 and 14 October U.S. Navy fliers claimed about 250 aerial victories and a similar number destroyed on the ground. A Japanese source places their air and ground losses at slightly over three hundred planes both combat and training types. Seventy-six U.S. carrier planes were lost in combat or considered operational losses. Japanese aerial counter attacks severely damaged cruisers U.S.S. Canberra and U.S.S. Houston putting both out of action for the rest of the war. Other ships were only lightly damaged. One of them was the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Franklin. One of four attacking Betty torpedo bombers barely missed with its torpedo, struck Franklin’s flight deck with its propellers chipping out chunks of the wooden deck before it bounced or slid off into the sea as a mass of flaming wreckage. In these attacks over a hundred Japanese aircraft were lost many from the 2nd Air Fleet.
[1] General references include Japanese Monograph No. 12, Philippine Air Operations Record Phase III (1946); Japanese Monograph No. 84, Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II (1947); Bates, The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944, Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Naval War College, 5 volumes (1953-1958); Morison, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, Little, Brown & Co. (1962); Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, Army Chief of Military History (1953); U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Campaigns of the Pacific War, Government Printing Office (1946).
[2] “Plan for this operation…for the first time I have moved beyond my land based air cover…I consider that your mission to cover this operation is essential and paramount.” MacArthur to Halsey, TWX 212240 (NCR 869).
[3] In late 1942 the Japanese Navy adopted a system of air group designation consisting of three cardinal (not ordinal) numbers. The numbers represented, respectively, (1) aircraft type, (2) supporting air arsenal or airbase where the unit was organized, and (3) chronological order of organization. In 1944 the flight elements within air groups were organized as fighter (Sentoo), attack (Kogeki), or reconnaissance (Teisatsu) hikotai “air units” usually with one or three digit numbers, e.g. S311 (fighter), K401 (attack), T101 (reconnaissance).