The homepage on my computer cycles various items of interest across the screen. These may be news or current events (fashion and celebrity gossip among them)  but also include some historical subjects, even aviation history. Among the latter are sometimes profiles or commentaries on World War II aircraft often fighters. In addition to a pretty photograph the text typically asserts that the aircraft profiled was the greatest or most important in some type of operation or theater of war; otherwise simply fastest, most victorious or best of its class. They seldom point out that the aircraft was average, a disappointment or even a dud under certain conditions. Herewith I begin a series of articles to point out shortcomings in some of the supposedly “great” aircraft and even debunk false claims about some of them. If I gore you favorite ox, sorry. One commentary was titled “The Spitfire: More than just a legendary fighter plane.”

For starters, episode 1, we address an aircraft that deserves to have its picture taken – the Supermarine Spitfire. This beautiful fighter is not much known for its participation in the Asia-Pacific war emphasized here. First, we start with a brief resume of its role in the West. Primarily it served in northern Europe but also in the Mediterranean region and made an appearance in Russia.

The Spitfire gained fame before entering combat due to its elegant lines and fine performance. However, its fame rose tremendously because of the 1940 Battle of Britain. “Never has so much been owed by so many to so few.” Without discussing the merits of claims versus losses here we note only that the Spitfire operated with several advantages. These included over home territory and with highly sophisticated fighter control. Just before the battle began most Spitfires were modified to take U.S. supplied 100 octane fuel allowing increased manifold pressure without damaging the engine. This made the Spitfire’s speed equal or superior to its main fighter opponent the Messerschmitt Bf 109E at low and medium altitudes as well as high altitude. 100 Octane Fuel Story

In 1941 improved models of the Spitfire, initially the Spitfire II, replaced the original model followed by the Spitfire V. Operations over the European Continent during 1941 were less successful than during defensive operations over Britain. Later in 1941 the Germans fielded improved Bf 109s and particularly the Fw 190. In 1942 the Spitfire had a negative victory to loss ratio against German fighters over France. An interesting note is that the U.S. supplied P-39 and P-40 had been rejected by the R.A.F. for operations from Britain due to their lackluster high altitude performance. The report of the U.S. officer overseeing the early Airacobra I (P-39) transition pointed out that the P-39 was superior to R.A.F. fighters in most low altitude characteristics. In addition to improved high altitude Spitfires the R.A.F. eventually fielded Spits optimized for low altitude operation – initially Spitfire L.F. V, later Spitfire XII.

Spitfire vs. Zero – Darwin March – September 1943

The Spitfire was sent to the Asia-Pacific area initially Australia in the second half of 1942. The Spitfire V the model sent was then the major production version although marks VIII and IX were entering production. The first fighter combats for Australian No. 1 Fighter Wing (R.A.F. No. 54 Squadron, R.A.A.F. Nos. 452 and 457 Squadrons) occurred in March 1943. Their opponents were pilots of Japanese Naval Air Group 202 primarily flying the Zero 21 although some replacement model 22 and 32 Zeros were flown during the year. Some Allied reports indicate ‘Haps’ were encountered in early operations. The Zero 32 had 25% less range than the Zero 21 and would have been hard pressed to cover the distance from Koepang, engage in combat and have a useful reserve for weather or other contingencies. Later in the campaign Lautem was used as a base for Zeros making the distance more congenial for Zero 32s. The Spitfires were the tropicalized (Vokes air filter) mark Vc.

The Spitfire’s first victim over Darwin was a Dinah reconnaissance plane.

Tactical conditions were somewhat reminiscent of the Battle of Britain. The Spitfires defended over friendly territory. There were several radar stations providing information to a fighter control center with additional information provided by radars for AA control. The Zeros were typically escorting medium bombers. Instead of crossing the English Channel they flew more than five hundred statute miles across open ocean before engaging in combat. The Spitfire’s initial Australian combat was a success. In February a high flying Japanese reconnaissance plane was shot down. Previously the Japanese Army Type 100 Headquarters Reconnaissance Plane had flown over the Darwin area with virtual impunity. Spitfires would gain additional success against Dinahs in coming months.

The first clash between Zeros and Spitfires was not a bomber escort mission but a strafing attack on the Beaufighter base at Coomalie Creek. This was the first appearance of the Zero over Australia since an escort mission in late August 1942. Twenty-one Zeros were apparently divided into the attack unit, their direct escort, and a free-wheeling roving cover unit (yugekitai). They were first detected 160 miles from Darwin (typical in subsequent attacks). A command element led by 20-victory ace W/C Clive Caldwell was up first followed by two squadrons of twenty-four Spitfires. Neither side engaged its full force in air combat. The Australians estimated fifteen Zeros were involved but not all of these were engaged by the six Spitfires in action. Three Zeros unsuccessfully chased a Beaufighter at low level near Coomalie Creek. Three other Zeros swept over the airfield where they strafed a camp site and aircraft. Material damage included a Beaufighter destroyed. There was some additional material damage including a second Beaufighter slightly damaged and a few personnel casualties. In the air combat the Spits claimed three victories, two by Caldwell, and one damaged. Victorious pilots reported seeing aircraft crash into the sea. The Japanese claimed six (P-39s and Buffaloes) apparently three certain and three uncertain. Neither side suffered loss. The Japanese reported two Zeros took hits but returned to base. Most reports indicate no Spitfires were damaged. However, an Allied Air Forces intelligence summary quotes the combat report of S/Ldr. Eric Gibbs stating his Spitfire was hit with the engine cowling holed and loss of glycol. He broke off combat and returned to base due to his damage. Allied report 3:nil. Actual box score 0:0 with one Allied ground loss.

The relative performance of Zero and Spitfire was assessed in this and other early actions. Caldwell reported the Spitfire was apparently faster in level flight and in diving. The two aircraft were about equal in climb with the Zero climbing at a steeper angle. The Zero was more maneuverable. The entire interception lasted little more than an hour and a quarter at altitudes up to 20,000 feet, but several of the Spitfires landed with their fuel nearly exhausted. The Zero had far superior endurance.

After this combat Australian Prime Minister Curtain announced the previously secret presence of Spitfires in Australia. He pointed out that they were adapted for use in the tropics and that the Australian and British pilots that flew them were combat veterans from Britain, Malta and Egypt. This was true. No. 1 Fighter Wing contained more than enough pilots who had flown combat missions with operational squadrons to mount a full strength wing effort of thirty-six Spitfires. Among them were some aces and very experienced pilots. Among all pilots including supernumerary, totaling ninety-five, slightly less than half the wing’s pilots had previously been in combat. All had received a few months flight and tactical training in Australia. The Japanese press reported Curtain’s statement and repeated parts of it verbatim. The wing’s opponents pilots of Air Group 202 were generally experienced, but the unit had been tasked to supply pilots to the Southeast Area Fleet at Rabaul where attrition was high in the Guadalcanal campaign.  A portion of its pilots had limited experience and there were few supernumerary pilots.

Officially Air Group 202’s wartime establishment changed from thirty-six model 21 and 32 Zeros for employment and twelve as spares (No. 1 Fighter Wing T/OE was similar) to forty-five for employment and fifteen spares effective 1 March 1943. However, the 27 Zeros provided for the bomber escort mission to Darwin on 15 March was virtually a maximum effort. After turn backs nineteen bombers and twenty-six Zeros approached Darwin. The turn back Zero failed to return to base. Thirty-one Spitfires from all three squadrons scrambled.

The raid on 15 March was described as the heaviest yet by the Australian press. Various targets were hit including two huge fuel storage tanks set ablaze and two empty tanks damaged. The Spitfires claimed seven (6 fighters, 1 bomber) destroyed, seven probable and five damaged. The Japanese fighters claimed eleven sure kills and five uncertain to which the bombers added one. Eight bombers were hit by fighters or AA but all returned. One Zero and its pilot went down in Darwin harbor. Four Spitfires were lost with three pilots killed. One loss was the experienced No. 452 squadron commander seven-victory ace, Raymond Thorold-Smith. Box score Spitfires 1: Zeros 4.

During February and March a total of twenty Nakajima-built Zero 21s were shipped from Japan to the 61st Air Arsenal in Formosa for eventual delivery to Air Group 202. Few apparently arrived by the end of March since late in the month Air Group 202 reported twenty-seven Zeros operational at four different bases. Some Zeros no doubt arrived in April and possibly some new pilots. In any event Air Group 202 devoted much of April to training aimed at perfecting long distance overwater operations. It also kept aircraft on alert and intercepted raids by U.S. B-24s and Dutch Mitchell bombers during the month and on the first day of May.

There were no Japanese air attacks in the Darwin area during April 1943. The local commands including No. 1 Fighter Wing had more than a month in which to absorb lessons learned, train and improve techniques and tactics. Technical issues with the Spitfires could be addressed. The Spitfire Vc had provision for fitting an external 30-gallon “slipper” tank or a 90-gallon belly tank. None had been used.

On May 2, 1943, the Japanese sent eighteen bombers escorted by twenty-six Zeros against Darwin. Making excuses for the Spitfires poor combat performance against the Zero in this raid/interception is just one of many examples. For a somewhat dispassionate view of this and other actions from the Australian perspective go to the Australian War Memorial website for Volume II – Air War Against Japan, 1943–1945 (1968 reprint) | Australian War Memorial (awm.gov.au)  43 et seq. The Australian press, repeated internationally, ascribed the losses to “bad weather.” An excuse was apparently needed because the Allied communique announced that losses had been “heavy”, a first for such communiques. Losses beyond those directly resulting from combat (all resulted from combat either directly or indirectly) came primarily because of the Spitfire’s poor endurance compared to the Zero as well as the Zero’s ability to compete with the Spitfire on more than equal terms.

Eighteen Japanese bombers escorted by twenty-six Zeros made the attack. Thirty-three Spitfires scrambled, four dropped out before interception. Bottom line – Allied claims six destroyed, four probably destroyed, nine damaged. Japanese fighter claims seventeen certain and four uncertain. Japanese loss none. Spitfire loss – fourteen. Allied sources generally admit that five (or seven) aircraft and two pilots were lost to enemy action. The other nine losses are attributed to either engine failure (4) or fuel shortage (5). However, it seems possible some of the “indirect” losses occurred after pilots engaged in combat and overstressed their engines or incurred combat damage. Regarding engine stress see the article on Zero 21 performance indicating the Japanese pilots often flew their Zeros to obtain speeds above “normal maximum speed” [ Zero 21 performance RLDunn.com] Box score, depending on your inclination is either (1) Spitfires nil: Zeros 5; or Spitfires nil: Zeros 14.

Captured Zero 21 restored to flight status. Test results understated Zero performance

In addition to any inherent deficiencies in the Spitfire, No. 1 Fighter Wing tactics were not optimal. Although they adopted the finger-four formation they often resorted to line-astern formation when attacking. This negated the defensive virtue of the finger-four formation at a critical juncture. After this mission the Spitfires were generally equipped with drop tanks.

On 10 May nine Zeros attacked Millingimbi where a detachment of six No. 457 Squadron Spitfires was on guard. Five Spitfires were already airborne when the alert was received. Six Zeros jumped the Spitfires initiating a wild dogfight. Meanwhile three other Zeros carried out a strafing attack on the airfield and shipping. Two Beaufighters were strafed on the ground and an airborne Beaufighter was chased. The Spitfires claimed two Zeros destroyed and another probable. One Zero failed to return and another ditched on the return flight. The Zeros claimed six aircraft. One Spitfire damaged in the initial dogfight encountered Zeros, presumably the strafers, while attempting to land. An extended combat ensued before the Spitfire crashed. The pilot was not seriously hurt. Ground guns claimed damage to one Zero. In addition to the lost Spitfire, one Beaufighter was burned and another damaged on the ground. A small ship also was burned out. Spitfires: 2, Zeros: 1.

Millingimbi was the target again on 28 May. Seven Zeros escorted nine medium bombers of Air Group 753. Seven Spitfires intercepted and made numerous firing passes at the bombers despite some interference from the escort. Spitfires claimed three bombers destroyed and one damaged. Two bombers went down and a third brought its crew back to Babo but was badly damaged in a crash landing. Bombers claimed four Spitfires and Zeros claimed one. Two Spitfires were lost with their pilots. All the Zeros returned, two having been hit by enemy fire. Details of the box score are unclear but overall the Japanese lost three bombers in exchange for two Spitfires. Allies: 3; Japanese: 2 with one Allied ground loss.

With their numbers dispersed across several bases and multiple missions to perform, by mid-June the Zeros and Type 1 land attack bombers of the 23rd Air Flotilla had not visited Darwin for over six weeks. On June 17, a Japanese Dinah thoroughly reconnoitered the Darwin area despite AA fire and the scramble of over three dozen Spitfires. Two days later radio intelligence detected bombers arriving at Koepang and predicted a raid for the following day. Rather than Navy aircraft on the 20th bombers and fighters of the Japanese Army 7th Flying Division challenged Darwin’s defenders. Twenty-two Type 1 model II fighters of the 59th Flying Regiment (FR) escorted eighteen Type 100 heavy bombers of the 61st FR and nine Type 99 light bombers of the 75th FR. The Type 100 Helens attacked at high level while the Type 99 Lilys came in at minimum height. The Spitfire Wing received plenty of warning and forty-six Spitfires were at altitude as the Japanese approached. AA engaged both high level and low level bombers. Spitfires claimed nine bombers (most Bettys) and five fighters (Zekes and Haps) destroyed and ten damaged. Two Spitfires were lost with their pilots killed. A couple Spitfires were damaged, one that crash landed at base was returned to service after several months repair. Japanese claimed nine Spitfires sure and six uncertain. Outright Japanese losses were one heavy bomber and one fighter. One heavy bomber and two light bombers force landed at base in damaged condition. Spitfires: 2, Type 1 fighters, 2. An interesting sidelight relates to the lost heavy bomber. The wreckage of Type 100, No. 174 was inspected. Although the serial number identifies the Helen as a model I, it was equipped with the 1,450 h.p. engines of the model II indicating it had been upgraded to model II standard.

The Japanese Navy was back on June 28 with just nine medium bombers. Twenty-seven Zeros started out from Lautem in far eastern Timor a shorter distance than from Kupang where the bombers started. Apparently not all the Zeros rendezvoused with the bombers. Only nine were observed when they reached Darwin. The Australians had plenty of advance warning and forty-two Spitfires were up. The bombers dropped their loads causing only modest damage and were on their way home when the Spitfires made contact. Spitfires were credited with four fighters destroyed and two bombers probably destroyed. All the Japanese aircraft returned to base. Two bombers suffered battle damage, one of which force-landed. An engine on a bomber caught fire from an anti-aircraft hit. The fire was extinguished by the automatic CO2 system. Bettys equipped with automatic fire extinguishers and rubber underwing coatings of integral fuel tanks were somewhat less vulnerable than previously. Three Zeros had been hit and one pilot was wounded. One Spitfire was destroyed, one crashed on a beach where water added to combat damage, a third returned to base with damage. No pilots were lost. Spitfires: 0, Zeros: 1.

Two days later the target was Fenton airfield (Brock’s Creek to the Japanese) south of Darwin home of the U.S. 380th Bomb Group. This was an extended interception which the Spitfires were able to accomplish due to using drop tanks. Forty-one Spitfires scrambled and thirty-eight intercepted twenty-two bombers and twenty-seven Zeros. Spitfire claims ran to six bombers and two fighters. No Japanese aircraft were lost. A Japanese bomber that crash landed near its base had apparently turned back on the outbound route. Zeros claimed sixteen Spitfires. Six Spitfires were lost, and two others crash landed with combat damage but were repairable. On the ground three B-24s were destroyed and seven damaged. A Curtiss Falcon was destroyed along with spare engines and other valuable equipment. Spitfires: 0, Zeros: 6.

The following week the Japanese returned to Brock’s Creek with twenty-two bombers and twenty-seven Zeros. They were opposed by thirty-three Spitfires that harassed the Japanese formation both before and after the bombing. A B-24 was destroyed, three others were damaged. Sixty and 250kg bombs also damaged anti-aircraft guns and holed the runway. Various versions of Spitfire claims were given. The initial official communique claimed five bombers and two fighters destroyed, two bombers probably destroyed and two bombers damaged. This was later revised upward. The official history (Odgers cited above) gives six bombers, and two fighters destroyed and others damaged. Claims allocated by No. 1 Fighter Wing were apparently four bombers destroyed, four probably destroyed and five damaged; three fighters destroyed and one damaged. For their part the Zeros claimed fourteen certain victories. Eight Spitfires and three pilots were lost. Two of the Spitfire losses were considered due to engine failure. The Japanese lost two bombers. The wreckage of Type 1 land attack bomber No. 3677 was found and inspected. Two other damaged bombers force-landed on return. All the Zeros returned to base. Spitfires: 2, Zeros: 6.

The last clash of Zeros and Spitfires over Australia like the first one was atypical and needs some background. The first Spitfire victory in the Pacific theater was against a Japanese Army Type 100 headquarters recon plane. In 1942 the Japanese Navy had flown many recon missions over Australia using its Type 98 land recon plane (C5M2). Fewer missions were flown in early 1943. Beginning in October 1942 the Army’s more advanced high altitude Type 100 (Dinah) recon plane flying without fighter escort provided useful information for both the Japanese army and navy in numerous sorties over Australia. The first Spitfire success against the Dinah in early February 1943 was followed a month later by a second. Dinahs continued to appear over Darwin and other Northern Territory areas often preceding bombing raids. A third Spitfire victory occurred on 18 July 1943 when Capt. Shunji Sasaki, CO of the 70th Independent Chutai, was shot down. Sasaki was lionized in Japanese press and  broadcasts for the outstanding success he and his unit had achieved. Meanwhile the 70th Fc was joined by a navy recon detachment (part of Air Group 202) flying a few Dinahs in reconnaissance missions over Australia. Disaster struck on 17 August when multiple sorties were flown involving both units. Spitfires shot down three Army and one Navy Dinah. The wreckage of two of the Japanese aircraft was found.

The unusual mission of 7 September 1943 saw thirty-six Zeros up from Lautem to escort three Dinahs to the Darwin area. The Japanese were detected while 180 miles away and forty-eight Spitfires scrambled. Nine guarded against a low level attack on their air bases. Thirty-nine climbed to confront the intruders at high altitude. Despite an hour’s advance warning most Spitfires were below the Zeros’ estimated altitude of 27,000 feet when they arrived. One squadron of Spitfires was 2,000 feet below and another was 4,000 feet below them. The Zeros were estimated to number twenty in company with one reconnaissance plane. The Spitfire wing leader ordered a turn away from the Zeros to gain height. The Zeros engaged before the Spitfires completed the maneuver ordered. The Spitfires claimed five Zeros for three of their own lost with one pilot killed and two parachuted safely. One Zero failed to return, cause unknown, and four were hit. The Zeros claimed seventeen, most Spitfires but with a couple P-40s thrown in. Spitfires:1; Zeros 3.

The verdict of history often depends on who is telling the story. Caldwell asserted “No. 1 Fighter Wing did a job which on the basis of enemy aircraft downed to our own losses, compared favorably with the Battle of Britain.” That comparison as given in Spitfires Over Darwin 1943 (Jim Grant, 1995) for Darwin raids from 2 March to 6 July: 33 Spitfires lost, 30 Japanese bombers and 24 Japanese fighters destroyed. Excluding the Japanese army raid the numbers are 30 Spitfires lost and 21 Japanese bombers and 25 Zeros destroyed. In either case the ratio favoring the Spitfire is better than 1.5:1. Even if not great this shows the Spitfire in a favorable light.

Giving Spitfires credit for Japanese bombers lost while being escorted by Zeros as well as Zero losses, in the Zero versus Spitfire combats recounted above the loss ratio is 28 to 9 in favor of the Zeros or about 3 to 1. This is far different than the story based on either side’s victory claims. The Spitfire was far from great in the actions during the period reviewed here.

Let’s delve deeper into this narrative. How do you interpret the Spitfire’s role during this crucial period? I invite you to share your thoughts and insights in the comments section below.